Naval War College Review
Volume 68
Number 3 Summer

Article 11

2015

The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret
Strategy to Replace Americaas the Global
Superpower, by Michael Pillsbury
Arthur Waldron

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Waldron, Arthur (2015) "The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace Americaas the Global Superpower, by
Michael Pillsbury," Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 3 , Article 11.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/11

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Waldron: The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace Ame

BOOK REVIEWS

A BIT OF A MAVERICK
Pillsbury, Michael. The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the
Global Superpower. New York: Henry Holt, 2015. 319pp. $30

The Hundred-Year Marathon is the
culmination of a lifetime’s work on
Chinese security policy by Dr. Michael
Pillsbury (1945–), an independent
China analyst based in Washington,
D.C. The book is popular, not academic.
That said, it is by and large accurate
and must be read and digested.
At the outset, though, two issues must be
raised. One is the title. The other is the
author. The title suggests, with no evidence, that somehow a secret Masonic
cabal has existed in China for a century,
having as its purpose the overthrow
of the United States as leading world
power. Taken literally that would mean
planning got under way in 1915, under
President Yuan Shikai, continued during
Chiang Kai-shek’s watch, and then on
through Mao Zedong and beyond—
which, bluntly put, is not history at all,
but classic tinfoil-hat conspiracy theory.
China’s changing international behavior
over the last century is indeed difficult
to explain, but it is most certainly not
the product of some arcane “Protocols
for the Replacement of America.”
As for Pillsbury, he is well-trained, hardworking, and independently wealthy.
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He is the author of original and definitive books about the People’s Liberation
Army. He is also a bit of a maverick: a
one-man show, rarely part of a team.
Long a proponent of pro-China policies,
including sale of weapons to Beijing in
the 1980s and 1990s, he has, as he tells
it, changed his mind as he has learned
more. While a “panda hugger” he was
well treated and given much “access”—
which means access to people whose job
is to deceive you, as well as hospitality.
In 2006, however, he published an article
in the Wall Street Journal decisively
repudiating his previous views—and felt
the back of Beijing’s hand until 2013.
Then he was able to return to China,
as Beijing sought to shore up support,
faced with the South China Sea crisis,
to be discussed below (pages 129–30).
Pillsbury is not to be believed without
question. He has had numerous runins with counterintelligence officials
owing to his seemingly uncontrollable proclivity to leak secrets—to this
reviewer, for example, in the passenger
seat of his vintage Jaguar motorcar.
Here, however, we are reviewing neither
the sales strategy nor the author of
this book, but rather its argument.
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The book makes two fundamental
contentions. First, Pillsbury states
that the Asian region and the United
States currently face the problem of
an unexpectedly aggressive China.
Second, he argues that this unpleasant
surprise is no more than the product
of decades of official self-delusion
about Beijing, even when confronted
with mountains of facts that supported
opposite conclusions. This reviewer
agrees with these two points, albeit with
many academic caveats that will be
spared. Disagreement arises only when
speculation begins about the future.
For roughly forty years, from the Nixon
diplomacy of the 1970s to about 2010,
the idea that China could pose a threat
militarily was considered so mistaken
as to be effectively beyond toleration
in either academic or governmental
circles. The insistent conviction was that
“engagement” would transform China
into a strong economy, a friend, even an
ally, and most likely a democracy as well
(page 7). Among the few in Washington
not convinced by these arguments was
the longtime head of the Pentagon’s
Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall, who did much to support Pillsbury’s work through contract research.
China is of course a new country. The
first states having that word as part of
their official names were founded in
the last century: the Republic of China
in 1911; then after the Chinese civil
war, the People’s Republic of China in
1949. Before that a myriad of states,
some ethnically Chinese, some not,
rose and fell on the East Asian plain.
To lump them all together as a political “China” to be treated as a historical entity having thousands of years of
history is a profound error, as specialists
now recognize. Still, the continuity of a
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distinct culture belonging to the Chinese
people must not be underestimated.
If one were to undertake a comprehensive study of the view of force
within this cultural tradition, the first
consideration would be the extreme
pacifism expressed in the classics of
Confucianism, created two millennia
in the past, and long official orthodoxy.
The mainstream of Chinese thought—
not a pretense but a conviction—sees
superior virtue and civilization as the
way to genuine power, as is testified
by the vast corpus of classical writings,
memorized by scholars for generations
and not forgotten today, as well as the
volumes of official memorandums on
foreign policy, in which opposition to
force is regularly the winning argument.
Pillsbury, however, makes no claim to be
writing about “China” in general or even
broadly about today’s People’s Republic.
He says little about Confucianism because others have said much, and focuses instead on the all-but-forbidden tradition of writers on military topics, the
bingjia whose heyday was also two millennia ago, but whose influence has continued, like an underground stream, ever
since, to emerge today in what Pillsbury
calls “the Chinese hawks,” or yingpai.
Seemingly overlooked by official American estimates, these hawks have no truck
with engagement, are deeply antiforeign
and anti-American, and seek Chinese
hegemony to be achieved through
deception, strategic dominance, and the
use of particularly effective weapons
usually called in English, rather awkwardly, “assassins’ maces” (shashoujian).
They do not lack influence.
Pillsbury has come to know and understand this group by employing the
most elementary but often neglected
methods of information gathering:
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namely, reading their work and having
long conversations with them (he speaks
excellent Chinese). The results of years
of such research, by Pillsbury and others,
effectively upend the conventional wisdom of nearly half a century. The questions that follow are: First, how did we
go wrong? And second, what to do now?
To answer the first question, “what went
wrong,” requires going back to President
Richard Nixon and his national security
adviser, Henry Kissinger. That China
would reenter the international system
was long a near certainty in their time.
Maoism was beginning to be recognized
internally as having been an unmitigated
catastrophe, not only for the Chinese
people, but also for the military—though
many foreigners still idolized the man.
The Soviet Union moreover presented
China with a threat requiring a counterweight. The only question was how
exactly China would return. Sadly, these
two Americans devised an utterly unrealistic plan that set our diplomacy on a
course that, unsurprisingly, has brought
unexpected and baleful consequences.
Nixon and Kissinger seem to have
imagined a future in which an intimate
Beijing–Washington political axis would
supersede the entire then-existing
security system in Asia. Such a vision
seems the only possible explanation
for Nixon’s quite astonishing question
to Mao when they met on 21 February 1972: “Is it better for Japan to be
neutral, totally defenseless, or it is [sic]
better for a time for Japan to have some
relations with the United States? The
point being—I am talking now in the
realm of philosophy—in international
relations there are no good choices.”
Put bluntly, Nixon seems already to
have decided, long before the meeting,
to drop relations with Japan, then our
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closest ally, in favor of China. (Japan
was of course kept in the dark.) But
Mao was bored and somnolent as the
two leaders spoke. Neither he nor any
other Chinese ever took up this offer.
How could so unrealistic an American policy plan have come into being?
The answer is by wishful thinking and
self-deception: in this case, aided by the
rigorously selective limitation of sources
to those that supported the policy
already adopted. Only a tiny secret
team knew of the plan. The books they
read were uniformly from the strongly
pro-Mao school of writing then current
(Kissinger, White House Years [Boston:
Little, Brown, 1979], p. 1051). Other
books, many by better scholars, existed
but were not consulted. Likewise, the
speaker invited to the White House to
enlighten the Americans was the erratic
Frenchman André Malraux. Others
were incomparably more knowledgeable and available—to name but two,
the American Foreign Service officer
Edward E. Rice and the Berlin professor Jürgen Domes—but they were not
even contacted. Thus, information that
had been intentionally biased formed
the deepest foundation for our policy.
But the longed-for axis between Beijing
and Washington never came into being. Quite the opposite happened.
Starting in the first decade of this
century, with now-retired leaders holding the reins, China openly changed
its visible foreign policy to dangerous military adventurism, for reasons
no one can explain. The change has
not succeeded. Thus the conquest of
Scarborough Shoal undertaken in spring
2012, which Beijing no doubt expected
to be a military cakewalk against the
Filipinos, has turned into a military
and diplomatic standoff, drawing in
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more players, losing China prestige, and
showing no sign of ending (page 203).
It is as yet unclear that continuing
irresponsible expansion will be the
gravamen of President Xi Jinping’s
foreign policy. China’s current leader
took power in November 2012
months after the Scarborough Shoal
standoff began and while he has not
repudiated the policy he seems far
more intent on domestic reform.
China could even liberalize: recently
the down-market and often xenophobic
Beijing tabloid Global Times attacked
Western “pro-China” scholars for
insulting that country by explaining
away repression as the only answer to
otherwise inevitable chaos. “Western
scholars have never imagined that
China might have a ‘peaceful democratic transition,’” the tabloid observed
(8 March 2015). These astonishing
words did not appear by accident: the
Global Times is wholly owned by the
party’s most authoritative mouthpiece,
the People’s Daily. Xi must be aware that
even small external distractions will
almost certainly derail domestic reform.
As for what the rest of the world should
do, obviously it is time to prepare: to
rearm and deter seriously. The region,
however, is responding so robustly
to Chinese aggression that Beijing is
alarmed. Japan today is not a mighty
power only because it chose to try
peace instead. Let no one doubt that if
Tokyo deems it necessary, it will emerge
again—indeed that is its current
direction—which would be perhaps the
greatest imaginable setback possible
for the Chinese political and economic
future. Nearly every other state in
Asia too, from India to the Philippines
and beyond, is rapidly and effectively
preparing military capabilities that

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/11

Summer2015Review.indb 151

B O O K R E V I E WS

151

could present China with a nightmare
scenario in which it is at war with a
multiplicity of capable adversaries
along a front of more than four thousand miles, from India to Tokyo.
Pillsbury speaks of the risk of prematurely “asking the weight of the emperor’s cauldrons,” or wending (page
196), which sounds exotic. What it
means is showing your cards too soon.
China has in fact done just this, with the
consequences the Chinese sages would
have predicted: creating failure as others
react in time. My conclusion: we will
certainly soon see a highly militarized
Asia; we may see some skirmishes or
worse (though recall that the Chinese
esteem most those victories achieved
without fighting; they abhor long-term,
attritional war), but we most emphatically will not see Chinese hegemony,
either in the region or in the world.
ARTHUR WALDRON

Morris, David J. The Evil Hours: A Biography of
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015. 338pp. $27

The numbers are staggering. In 2012
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) estimated that eight thousand
veterans take their own lives every year.
Think about that—twenty-two people
die every day of whom many, in pain
and having lost hope, have carried their
war with them for far too long. For
some it may have been recent fighting in Afghanistan or Iraq; for others
it may have been decades ago in the
jungles of Southeast Asia. Regardless,
the trauma these people experienced
knows no boundaries between deserts
and mountains, between marshes and
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